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Demanding Due Process
TIME TO AMEND 8 U.S.C. § 1226(C) AND LIMIT
INDEFINITE DETENTION OF CRIMINAL
IMMIGRANTS
INTRODUCTION
Alejandro Rodriguez came to the United States from
Mexico with his family when he was an infant.1 Rodriguez
became a lawful permanent resident (LPR) at age nine and has
lived in the United States continuously since he first arrived.2
His family, including his parents, siblings, and three children,
also live in the United States either as citizens or LPRs.3
Rodriguez established a life in California and worked as a
dental assistant.4 When Rodriguez was nineteen years old, he
was convicted for “joyriding,” or driving a stolen vehicle, and
served two years in prison.5 Then, in 2003 at age twenty-four,
he was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and
was sentenced to five years of probation, but no jail time.6
In 2004, after remaining in the United States for
twenty-five years, Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) detained Rodriguez and commenced removal proceedings
for these two prior convictions.7 An immigration judge
determined that his prior conviction for joyriding constituted
an aggravated felony and ordered Rodriguez removed.8 After
several appeals in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit and a case abeyance, Rodriguez was finally
1 Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1073 (9th Cir. 2015), rev’d sub nom.
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
2 Id.; Christie Thompson, The Crucial Immigration Case About to Hit the
Supreme Court, MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.themarshallproject.org/
2016/11/29/the-crucial-immigration-case-about-to-hit-the-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/
2Y6K-HNSN].
3 Rodriguez, 804 F.3d at 1073.
4 Id.
5 Id.; Thompson, supra note 2.
6 Rodriguez, 804 F.3d at 1073; Thompson, supra note 2.
7 Rodriguez, 804 F.3d at 1073.
8 Id.
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released in 2007.9 He had spent three years and three months
in detention for a crime that the Ninth Circuit does not
consider an aggravated felony.10 Not once during his detention
did Rodriguez appear before an immigration judge for a bond
hearing to determine whether he was a flight risk or a danger
to the community and whether he could be released.11 As a
result of his prolonged detention, his life was disrupted: he lost
his job and did not see his children for three years.12 Not only
was Rodriguez deprived of his livelihood and family while he
was detained, but he was also deprived of a fundamental
constitutional right: due process.
There are dozens of cases like Rodriguez’s in which ICE
detains a criminal immigrant after release from prison and the
criminal immigrant spends months or years in detention
without an individualized bond hearing.13 If an immigrant has
not committed a deportable crime, then he or she is eligible to
request a bond hearing where an immigration judge determines
whether he or she is a flight risk or a danger to the community.14
Criminal immigrants subject to mandatory detention, however,
are not offered a bond hearing at all and must remain in custody
for the entire duration of his or her immigration case.15 Since
1996 when Congress passed the mandatory detention scheme,
there has been a surge in litigation surrounding this issue, and
detainees subjected to mandatory detention without
individualized bond hearings have repeatedly claimed that their
due process rights were violated.16
The crux of the issue is that the statute that mandates
detention of criminal immigrants,17 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), does not
Id.
Id.
11 Id. at 1065.
12 Thompson, supra note 2.
13 See generally Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486 (1st Cir. 2016); Sopo v. U.S. Att’y
Gen., 825 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2016); Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601 (2d Cir. 2015).
14 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2012); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1236.1(c)(8), (d) (2018).
15 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012).
16 See generally Reid, 819 F.3d 486; Sopo, 825 F.3d 1199; Lora, 804 F.3d 601.
17 The statute, as well as court opinions, federal government sources, and
many articles, refers to criminal immigrants as “criminal aliens” or “aliens.” See, e.g.,
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 510 (2003); Darlene C. Goring, Freedom from Detention:
The Constitutionality of Mandatory Detention for Criminal Aliens Seeking to Challenge
Grounds for Removal, 69 ARK. L. REV. 911, 911 (2017); Criminal Alien Statistics—
FY2018, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbpenforcement-statistics/criminal-alien-statistics [https://perma.cc/X8A3-LDJM]. Other
phrases have been used to describe immigrants who have been detained by ICE such as
“detainees,” “immigrant detainees,” “civil detainees,” and “civil immigration detainees.”
See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (stating that government detention of
immigrants is civil, not criminal); see also César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández,
Abolishing Immigration Prisons, 97 B.U. L. REV. 245, 256 (2017); Faiza W. Sayed,
9
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have a time limit or individualized bond hearing requirement:
“[t]he Attorney General18 shall take into custody any alien
who . . . is inadmissible [or deportable] by reason of having
committed [certain] offense[s]19 . . . when the alien is released”20
from prison.21 Thus, a criminal immigrant may spend months
or years in detention without an individualized bond hearing
even if he or she is not a flight risk or danger to the
community.22 This, some circuit courts have ruled, is a violation
of due process.23 Even though criminal immigrants are not
U.S.-born citizens, they are still protected under the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.24
This issue is more pressing than ever due to the
unprecedented backlog in immigration courts.25 At the end of
July 2017, the backlog was at an all-time high of 617,527
cases.26 By February 2018, the backlog had grown to 667,839
cases.27 Additionally, the average wait time for a hearing in
Note, Challenging Detention: Why Immigrant Detainees Receive Less Process Than
“Enemy Combatants” and Why They Deserve More, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1834
(2011). The focus of this note is on the population of immigrants who have been
convicted of one or more of the enumerated crimes set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). For
ease of reference, the note refers to these immigrants as “criminal immigrants.”
18 Although the statute mandates that the Attorney General detain criminal
immigrants, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 assigned almost all immigration
enforcement functions to the Secretary of Homeland Security. Reid, 819 F.3d at 493 n.1.
19 There are certain crimes for which an immigrant is inadmissible or
deportable. These crimes include crimes of moral turpitude (which include crimes such
as murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, robbery, and aggravated assaults),
aggravated felonies, violations of state or federal controlled substance laws, firearm
offenses, threats to the president, prostitution, human trafficking, money laundering,
or a crime where the sentence is longer than one year. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (2012); 8
U.S.C. §§ 1227 (a)(2)(A)(i)–(iii), (B), (C), (D) (2012); Criminal Resource Manual, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-1934-appendix
-d-grounds-judicial-deportation [https://perma.cc/WM6N-5AYF].
20 The language “when released” has also been controversial, since detention
can occur immediately, months, or even years after a criminal is released from prison.
But this controversy is outside the scope of this note’s focus. For more information on
the topic, see Margaret W. Wong, Challenged to Mandatory Detention Under U.S.
Immigration Law, FED. LAW., Sept. 2010, at 60, http://www.fedbar.org/Resources_1/FederalLawyer-Magazine/2010/The-Federal-Lawyer-September-2010/Features/Challenges-to-Mand
atory-Detention-Under-US-Immigration-Law.aspx?FT=.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XSV-8QJG].
21 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012).
22 Id. § 1226; Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015), rev’d
sub nom. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
23 See Sopo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 825 F.3d 1199, 1235 (11th Cir. 2016);
Rodriguez, 804 F.3d at 1090.
24 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).
25 Immigration Court Backlog Sets Record, Detainers Up, IMMIGRATIONPROF
BLOG (Sept. 1, 2017), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2017/09/new-fromtrac-immigration-court-backlog-sets-record-detainers-up.html [https://perma.cc/JMK4M5VQ].
26 Id.
27 Compare Backlog of Pending Cases in Immigration Courts as of December
2017, TRAC IMMIGRATION, http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/
apprep_backlog.php [https://perma.cc/9X7Y-4BL8] (667,839 cases in 2018) with
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immigration courts is now 718 days nationwide.28 This means
that criminal aliens detained upon release from their criminal
sentence wait an average of two years before a court hears
their removal case.29 Although there is a strong government
interest in preventing criminal immigrants’ flight and
protecting the community, there is also a constitutional
concern that prolonged detention without a hearing deprives
an individual of his or her liberty.30
Until a recent Supreme Court case, Jennings v.
Rodriguez, the circuit courts were split as to whether the
Constitution mandates an individualized bond hearing after six
months of detention, or whether there should be a case-by-case
approach to determine when detention becomes unreasonable
and thus unconstitutional.31 The United States Courts of
Appeals for the Second and Ninth Circuits employed a brightline approach and have held that the government should
provide a criminal immigrant with an individualized bond
hearing after six months in detention.32 By contrast, the United
States Courts of Appeals for the First, Third, Sixth, and
Eleventh Circuits rejected the bright-line approach and
adopted a case-by-case approach, holding that whether
detention becomes unreasonable depends on the specific facts
of the case.33 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
the circuit split and in Jennings found that criminal
immigrants are not entitled to periodic bond hearings at any
point during detention.34
Ballooning Wait Times for Hearing Dates in Overworked Immigration Courts, TRAC
IMMIGRATION (Sept. 21, 2015), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/405/ [https://
perma.cc/7WUG-ZJ8G] (465,644 cases in 2015) and Backlog in Immigration Cases
Continues to Climb: New Tool Offers Caseload Data by States, Courts and Nationality,
TRAC IMMIGRATION (Mar. 11, 2011), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/225/
[https://perma.cc/R5AS-4WFD] (228,421 cases in 2010).
28 Immigration Court Backlog Tool: Pending Cases and Length of Wait in
Immigration Courts, TRAC IMMIGRATION (2018), http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/
immigration/court_backlog [https://perma.cc/7CDT-UUUS].
29 Id.
30 Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1065, 1067 (9th Cir. 2015), rev’d sub
nom. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
31 Sopo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 825 F.3d 1199, 1223 (11th Cir. 2016).
32 Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 614–15 (2d. Cir. 2015); Rodriguez, 804
F.3d at 1090.
33 Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486, 498 (1st Cir. 2016); Sopo, 825 F.3d at 1215;
Diop v. Ice/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 234 (3d Cir. 2015); Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d
263, 271 (6th Cir. 2004). No other circuits have addressed this issue.
34 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 833 (2018). The Court’s holding also
applies to asylees and non-criminal immigrants since it found that Sections 1225(b) and
1226(a) of Title 8 of the United States Code also do not provide for bond hearings. See id. at
846; see also Kevin Johnson, Argument Analysis: Justices Seem Primed to Find Constitutional
Limits on the Detention of Immigrants, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 4, 2017, 12:44 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/10/argument-analysis-justices-seem-primed-find-constitution
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Due to the Court’s decision and the high stakes
resulting from the unprecedented immigration court backlog,
Congress must take steps to reform the statute. Since the
Jennings decision announced that Section 1226(c) does not
provide periodic bond hearings, the judicial ruling falls short in
upholding criminal immigrants’ due process rights. Congress
must amend the statute to provide specific due process
safeguards for criminal immigrants and mandate that they
receive a bond hearing after the six-month mark of detention.
Part I of this note provides the statutory framework of
mandatory detention for criminal immigrants, including its
history, Congress’s purpose, and how the framework evolved
through three separate bills. Part II discusses the foundational
Supreme Court cases that evaluated constitutional limits of
mandatory detention, as well as the resulting disagreements
among the circuits regarding prolonged mandatory detention
and due process. Part III provides insight as to why the
Supreme Court’s Jennings decision is an insufficient solution to
the problem of prolonged detention that does not comport with
due process requirements for criminal immigrants in light of
the immigration court backlog. Finally, Part IV advocates that
Congress amend 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) to include temporal
limitations on detention. Congress must adapt the statute to
the current state of affairs in the immigration courts, which is
vastly different from what it was when the statute was enacted
in 1996. If Congress does not amend the statute, the statute
will continue to jeopardize the liberty of criminal immigrants
as the backlog in immigration courts continues to soar.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF 8 U.S.C. § 1226(C) AND
IMMIGRANTS’ DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES

A.

Congressional Action in Response to Criminal
Immigrants in the Late Twentieth Century

After Congress codified immigration laws in the
Immigration and Nationality Act in 1952 (INA),35 criminal
immigrants were seldom ordered removed, even if they had

al-limits-detention-immigrants/ [https://perma.cc/BFJ9-4RHC]; Thompson, supra note 2. Those
statutes and classes of immigrants, however, are not the focus of this note.
35 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82–414, 66 Stat. 163
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22 U.S.C.); see also Immigration and
Nationality Act, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERV., https://www.uscis.gov/laws/
immigration-and-nationality-act [https://perma.cc/A2LA-NYKQ].
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committed a deportable offense.36 And even if a criminal
immigrant was ordered removed, he or she was rarely detained
during his or her removal proceedings.37 The Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS)38 did not have the resources or
capacity at the time to have an effective deportation or
detention system and Congress had not addressed the issue.39
Around the 1980s and 1990s, the “problem” of criminal
immigrants gained attention nationwide.40 According to a
Senate Report from 1995, “America’s immigration system [was]
in disarray and criminal aliens . . . constitute[d] a particularly
vexing part of the problem.”41 Local politicians were frustrated
that criminal immigrants were not deported and that INS did
little to address the problem.42
After years of neglect, criminal immigrants became a
legislative priority and, without considering the implications of
its actions, Congress acted swiftly.43 Immigration reform in the
1980s and 1990s was aimed at tightening border security and
reducing immigration amid growing anti-immigration
sentiment in the country.44 According to Congress, the most
effective strategy for attaining the country’s immigration policy
goals included deportation of criminal immigrants following
detention during removal proceedings.45

36 Margaret H. Taylor, Demore v. Kim: Judicial Deference to Congressional
Folly, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 347 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005).
37 Id.
38 The INS no longer exists today. It was abolished in 2003 and its functions
spread among three agencies: United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Customs and Border
Protection (CPB). About CPB, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION (last updated Nov. 21,
2016), https://www.cbp.gov/about [https://perma.cc/3XAS-ZBUT]; Our History, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERV. (last updated May 25, 2011), https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/
our-history [https://perma.cc/F6W3-T5PB]; Who We Are, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & CUSTOMS ENF’T
(last updated Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.ice.gov/about [https://perma.cc/DR7A-N8AA].
39 Peter H. Schuck & John Williams, Removing Criminal Aliens: The Pitfalls
and Promises of Federalism, 22 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 367, 373–74, 398, 402 (1999);
Taylor, supra note 36, at 347.
40 Taylor, supra note 36, at 347–48.
41 S. Rep. No. 104–48, at 1 (1995).
42 Peter Kerr, Moves to Deport Aliens for Drugs Are Not Pressed, N.Y. TIMES
(July 30, 1986), at A1, B5, http://www.nytimes.com/1986/07/30/nyregion/moves-todeport-aliens-for-drugs-are-not-pressed.html [https://perma.cc/NF94-T2R9].
43 Taylor, supra note 36, at 349.
44 Rachel Weiner, How Immigration Reform Failed, Over and Over, WASH. POST
(Jan. 30, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/01/30/howimmigration-reform-failed-over-and-over/?utm_term=.59f226a9a619 [https://perma.cc/
64FG-9H93].
45 Taylor, supra note 36, at 346.
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1. Strike One: The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (ADAA) expanded the
scope of deportable offenses to include aggravated felonies.46
Before the ADAA, the only deportable offenses besides national
security offenses were crimes of moral turpitude, narcotics
offenses, and violations of firearm laws,47 and even criminal
immigrants who committed such crimes could be released on
bond at the Attorney General’s discretion.48 Congress added
aggravated felonies to this list, including crimes such as
murder, drug trafficking, and illicit trafficking of firearms or
destructive devices.49 Additionally, the law mandated that the
Attorney General “take into custody any alien convicted of an
aggravated felony upon completion of the alien’s sentence for
such conviction [of an aggravated felony].”50
When challenged in court, some district courts held that
due to lack of prompt bail hearings, the ADAA was an
unconstitutional violation of due process.51 In response,
Congress amended the statute in 1990 and 1991 to provide
LPRs and lawfully permitted immigrants who committed
aggravated felonies with a hearing to determine whether the
immigrant was a threat to the community or a flight risk.52
Undocumented aggravated felons, however, could still be
detained without a bond hearing.53
Despite INS’s increasingly limited resources, Congress
continued to legislate and expand consequences for criminal
immigrants. Even though the amendments to the ADAA
46 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100–690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988)
(codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.); Schuck & Williams, supra note 39, at 372.
47 There is no clear legal definition for crimes of moral turpitude since its
definition is based on moral rather than legal standards. These crimes are considered acts of
vileness or depravity and generally include crimes like murder, arson, robbery, burglary,
larceny, and embezzlement. What Constitutes “Crime Involving Moral Turpitude” Within
Meaning of § 212(a)(9) and 241(a)(4) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1182(a)(9), 1251(a)(4)), and Similar Predecessor Statutes Providing for Exclusion or
Deportation of Aliens Convicted of Such Crime, 23 A.L.R. Fed. 480, § 2[a] (1975).
48 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a), 1252(a) (1982); Deborah F. Buckman, Validity,
Construction, and Application of Mandatory Predeportation Detention Provisions of
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.A. 1226(c)) As Amended, 187 A.L.R. Fed.
325, § 2[a] n.8 (2003).
49 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 § 7342, 102 Stat. at 4469–71 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)); Buckman, supra note 48, § 2[a].
50 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 § 7343, 102 Stat. at 4470 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)).
51 Kellman v. District Director, 750 F. Supp. 625, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Paxton v.
INS, 745 F. Supp. 1261, 1265–66 (E.D. Mich. 1990); Agunobi v. Thornburgh, 745 F. Supp.
533, 536–37 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Leader v. Blackman, 744 F. Supp. 500, 508–09 (S.D.N.Y 1990).
52 Buckman, supra note 48, § 2[a].
53 Taylor, supra note 36, at 349–50.
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reigned in the scope of the statute, the underlying problem—
INS’s growing deportation caseload and limited detention
capability—remained.54 The political rhetoric at the time also
focused on cracking down on criminal immigrants. As a result,
Congress expanded the definition of an aggravated felony in
1994 to include a wider range of crimes, including theft for
which the term of imprisonment is at least five years.55 Even
with these changes, Congress continued to focus on
immigration reform.56 There were several omnibus immigration
reform bills on Congress’s agenda in 1996, and it considered a
major overhaul for almost every part of the INA.57 One such
law was the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA), which targeted terrorism, but nonetheless had
deleterious effects on criminal immigrants.58
2. Strike Two: The Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996
Changes to the INA were prompted by the increase in
anti-immigration sentiment after the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, even though
the perpetrators of the Oklahoma City bombing were U.S.
citizens.59 After the Oklahoma City bombing, Congress wanted
to act quickly and pass a bill that would take a strong stance
against national and international terrorism.60 It drafted the
AEDPA, which included significant changes to immigration
laws.61 The bill was delayed over controversial measures such
as “secret trials” for deporting immigrant terrorists and was
pending in Congress for about a year.62 Anxious to pass the bill
before the first anniversary of the Oklahoma City bombing,
54 U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO-92-85, IMMIGRATION CONTROL: IMMIGRATION
POLICIES AFFECT INS DETENTION EFFORTS 40–43 (1992); Taylor, supra note 36, at 349–50.
55 Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103–146, § 222, 108 Stat. 4305, 4320–22 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)).
56 Immigration, Other Priorities on Congressional Agenda for 1996, 73
INTERPRETER RELEASES 133, 133 (Jan. 29, 1996).
57 Id. at 133–35; Taylor, supra note 36, at 349, 351.
58 Lena Williams, A Law Aimed at Terrorists Hits Legal Immigrants, N.Y.
TIMES (July 17, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/17/nyregion/a-law-aimed-atterrorists-hits-legal-immigrants.html [https://perma.cc/WU36-PXYD].
59 Austen Ishii, There and Back, Now and Then: IIRIRA’s Retroactivity and
the Normalization of Judicial Review in Immigration Law, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 949,
953 (2014); Claudia Wilner, “We Would Not Defer to That Which Did Not Exist”:
AEDPA Meetings the Silent State Court Opinion, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1442, 1458 (2002).
60 Final Anti-Terrorism Bill Contains Major Immigration Changes, 73
INTERPRETER RELEASES 521, 521 (Apr. 22, 1996).
61 Id.; see also Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
62 Taylor, supra note 36, at 349, 352.
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Congress had to finalize the bill by April 19, 1996.63 Thus, the
controversial issues still being debated as part of a
comprehensive immigration reform bill were inserted in the
AEDPA and passed with an overwhelming majority.64
The AEDPA made significant, damaging changes to
immigration law.65 In fact, during the bill signing ceremony,
President Clinton said, “this bill makes a number of major, illadvised changes to our immigration laws having nothing to do
with fighting terrorism.”66 Specifically, the law expanded the
categories of deportable offenses, and included crimes such as
theft offenses with a prison term of at least one year, fraud, tax
evasion, and perjury.67 Most significantly, the AEDPA required
detention for almost all criminal immigrants without bond
hearings.68 Even the INS and civil rights groups were caught offguard by the sudden and significant immigration provision passed
in this terrorism bill.69 Five months later, Congress passed yet
another major immigration reform bill, the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).70
3. Strike Three: The Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
The IIRIRA amended some of the controversial parts of
the AEDPA, but nonetheless made deportation prospects
significantly worse for criminal immigrants.71 The act expanded
Id.
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 §§ 435, 440, 110
Stat. at 1274–79 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Taylor, supra
note 36, at 349, 352.
65 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 §§ 435, 440, 110
Stat. at 1274–79 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (expanding
the description of crimes of moral turpitude which render an immigrant deportable,
prohibiting judicial review of a final order of deportation, providing for more
expeditious deportation of certain criminal immigrants, and expanding the definition of
aggravated felony); President Signs Terrorism Bill Into Law, Congress Passes
Corrections Measures, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 568, 568 (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter
President Signs Terrorism Bill into Law].
66 President Signs Terrorism Bill Into Law, supra note 65, at 568; see
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 435, 440, 110 Stat. at 1274-79
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); id.
67 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 §§ 435, 110 Stat. at 1274–
75 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Buckman, supra note 48, § 2[a].
68 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 440(c), 110 Stat.
at 1277 (codified in 8 U.S.C.); Taylor, supra note 36, at 349, 352.
69 Eric Schmitt, Provision in Terrorism Bill Cuts Rights of Illegal Aliens, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 19, 1996) http://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/19/us/provision-in-terrorismbill-cuts-rights-of-illegal-aliens.html [https://perma.cc/N73P-QMGB].
70 Illegal Immigration Reform & Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18, and 28 U.S.C.).
71 Illegal Immigration Reform & Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, § 303(a),
110 Stat. at 3009-585 (codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)); Taylor, supra note 36, at 349, 353.
63
64
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the definition of an aggravated felony and included crimes of
theft or violence with a sentence of at least one year, as
opposed to the previous threshold of five years.72 Additionally,
permanent residents who were convicted of an aggravated
felony and non-permanent residents who were convicted of any
crime that rendered them inadmissible could no longer obtain
relief from removal and were subject to deportation.73
Finally, the IIRIRA expanded the provisions of the
AEDPA that mandated detention for criminal immigrants
during removal proceedings.74 These provisions were codified
into today’s 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).75 Because of the IIRIRA,
detention of criminal immigrants is mandatory even if he or
she does not pose a danger to the community or pose a flight
risk.76 The IIRIRA was the most dramatic and harshest
immigration reform passed by Congress in the twentieth
century,77 and its effects are still felt today.78
With the passage of the ADAA of 1988, the AEDPA of
1996, and the IIRIRA of 1996, Congress drastically changed
immigration laws and imposed indefinite detention on criminal
immigrants.79 Given the current backlog in immigration court,80
this means that criminal immigrants are facing longer
detention periods—and thus, denial of due process.

72 Illegal Immigration Reform & Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996,
§ 321(a)(3), 110 Stat. at 3009-627 (codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(43)(F), (G)); Taylor, supra
note 36, at 349, 353.
73 Illegal Immigration Reform & Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996,
§§ 240A(a)(3), (b)(1)(C), 110 Stat. at 3009-594 (codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3),
(b)(1)(C)); Taylor, supra note 36, at 349, 353.
74 Illegal Immigration Reform & Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, § 236(c),
110 Stat. at 3009-585 (codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)); Taylor, supra note 36, at 349, 353.
75 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012); Taylor, supra note 36, at 349, 353 n.62.
76 Judy Rabinovitz, Ending the Laws That Fuel Mass Detention and
Deportation, ACLU: SPEAK FREELY (Oct. 20, 2011, 3:00 PM), https://www.aclu.org/
blog/immigrants-rights/ending-laws-fuel-mass-detention-and-deportation [https://
perma.cc/8Y6L-BHYF]. The IIRIRA provision does not allow the Attorney General to
release a criminal immigrant based on his or her discretion. Rather, it mandates
detention throughout the duration of the criminal immigrant’s removal proceedings,
regardless or his or her danger or flight risk. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c); Debra Lyn Bassett, In
the Wake of Schooner Peggy: Deconstructing Legislative Retroactivity Analysis, 69 U.
CIN. L. REV. 453, 460–61 (2001).
77 Schuck & Williams, supra note 39, at 371.
78 Rabinovitz, supra note 76.
79 Opal Tometi, Black Lives Matter Co-Founder: The Immigration Challenge
No One is Talking About, TIME (Apr. 29, 2016), http://time.com/4312628/immigration1996-laws/ [https://perma.cc/4UN6-FGRH].
80 Immigration Court Backlog Sets Record, Detainers Up, supra note 25.
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Can Criminal Immigrants Even Challenge 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c) in Court?

Even though criminal immigrants are not U.S.-born
citizens, they are still protected under the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment.81 What is not clear, however, is at
what point during detention criminal immigrants are deprived
of due process under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).82 Under section (e) of
the statute, “[n]o court may set aside any action or decision by
the Attorney General under this section regarding the
detention or release of any alien . . . .”83 Therefore, immigrants
challenging the constitutionality of Section 1226(c) generally do
so through writs of habeas corpus.84 After IIRIRA and its
progeny were codified, habeas corpus litigation exploded.85 The
Supreme Court tackled the constitutionality of indefinite
detention in two seminal decisions: Zadvydas v. Davis and
Demore v. Kim.86
II.

LITIGATION EFFECT OF MANDATORY DETENTION
SCHEMES

Immigrant detainees first challenged the mandatory
detention scheme in the Supreme Court with Zadvydas v. Davis in
2001.87 The Supreme Court’s subsequent ruling in Demore v. Kim
in 2003, however, appears to be inconsistent.88 In Zadvydas, the
Court read an implicit limit in the detention statute at issue and
stated that “[a] statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien
would raise a serious constitutional problem.”89 Then, just two
years later, the Supreme Court in Demore refused to read an
implicit limit in the detention statute and stated that “[brief]
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).
Sopo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 825 F.3d 1199, 1223 (11th Cir. 2016).
83 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (2012).
84 Buckman, supra note 48, § 2[a].
85 Nancy Morawetz, Back to the Future—Lessons Learned from Litigation
over the 1996 Restrictions on Judicial Review, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 113, 114 (2006). A
writ of habeas corpus is a petition to the court to ensure that a person’s imprisonment
or detention is legal. Habeas Corpus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). The
number of federal cases reviewing orders of the Board of Immigration Appeals,
including habeas cases, increased 970 percent from the years 1996 to 2007. Donald S.
Dobkin, Court Stripping and Limitations on Judicial Review of Immigration Cases, 28
JUST. SYS. J. 104, 106–07 (2007).
86 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 679–80; Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 511 (2003);
Buckman, supra note 48, § 2[a].
87 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 679–80.
88 Demore, 538 U.S. at 511; see also Suzanna Sherry, The Unmaking of a Precedent,
55 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 251 (2003); Johnson, supra note 34; Taylor, supra note 36, at 366.
89 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
81

82
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[d]etention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally
permissible part of that process.”90 The Supreme Court upheld brief
detention periods without due process, but did not address whether
prolonged detentions require temporal limitations to comport with
due process.91 While this latter issue is at the heart of Jennings v.
Rodriguez, it is imperative to understand what ultimately led to
the circuit courts’ disagreements and the Jennings decision: the
Court’s legal foundation for mandatory detention.
A.

The Supreme Court’s Seminal Decisions on the
Constitutionality of Mandatory Detention
1. A Victory for Detained Immigrants: Zadvydas v.
Davis

In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court considered the
challenge of two immigrants who were held in detention past
the ninety-day removal period due to the government’s
inability to remove them.92 The Court held that a removable
immigrant may be detained for “a period reasonably necessary
to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States” but
that the statute “does not permit indefinite detention.”93
Reading the statute otherwise, the majority held, “would raise
a serious constitutional problem.”94
Rebutting the government’s assertion that immigrants’
liberty interests are diminished by their lack of legal status in
the United States, the Court stated that “an alien’s liberty
interest is, at the least, strong enough to raise a serious question
as to whether, irrespective of the procedures used . . . the
Constitution permits detention that is indefinite and potentially
permanent.”95 The government attempted to justify indefinite
detention by arguing that the purpose of the statute was to
Demore, 538 U.S. at 531.
Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: Decision in SCOTUS Immigration Case
Could Hinge on Government’s Admission of Error, ABA J. (Nov. 29, 2016, 3:00 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky_due_process_and_detention
[https://perma.cc/C2FN-64V2].
92 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 678, 684. Once an immigrant is ordered to be
removed, the government has ninety days to remove him or her and must hold him or
her in custody during this removal period. After the removal period, the government
may continue to detain an immigrant who is still in the United States or release the
immigrant under supervision. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) (2012); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 683.
The statute in question in Zadvydas was 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), not 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), but
the Court’s analysis and holding is applicable to the discussion of prolonged detention.
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 683.
93 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689.
94 Id. at 690.
95 Id. at 696.
90
91
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prevent flight and to protect the community.96 The Court found
that these arguments were insufficient. To counter the flight
risk argument, the Court said that in both cases, deportation
was unlikely and thus “detention’s goal was no longer practically
attainable.”97
Additionally,
the
Court
dismissed
the
government’s concern about protection of the community by
stating, “we have upheld preventive detention based on
dangerousness only when limited to especially dangerous
individuals and subject to strong procedural protections.”98
Finally, the Court acknowledged that the judicial branch
generally defers to Congress and the executive branch in
immigration affairs, but also stated that those branches’ power
is still “subject to important constitutional limitations.”99 Here,
the Constitution required that the government detain
immigrants for only a reasonable period of time.100 The Court
imposed a six month limitation, noting that Congress previously
doubted the constitutionality of detention for longer than six
months based on the 1957 version of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d).101
Therefore, the Court recognized the six-month period as
the reasonable period of detention, after which, if the
immigrant proves that there is no reasonable possibility of
deportation in the foreseeable future, the burden shifts to the
government to show evidence that rebuts the immigrant’s
evidence.102 Ultimately, it was a win for criminal immigrants
since the Court reaffirmed the principle that immigrants were
protected under the Due Process Clause, and therefore could
not be held indefinitely without the government proving by
clear and convincing evidence that the criminal immigrant was
dangerous or a flight risk.103
2. A Setback for Detained Immigrants: Demore v. Kim
Despite this step forward for criminal immigrants, the
Court took two steps back when it analyzed the
constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) in Demore v. Kim.104 The
majority held that Congress has the authority to mandate that
Id. at 690–91.
Id. at 690.
98 Id. at 690–91.
99 Id. at 695.
100 See id.
101 Id. at 701 (citing United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 195 (1957)).
102 Id.
103 Buckman, supra note 48, § 2[a]; Power to Admit to Bail in Deportation
Case, 36 A.L.R. 887 (1925).
104 Buckman, supra note 48, § 2[a].
96
97
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criminal immigrants be detained “for the limited period of
[their] removal proceedings” and that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) is
therefore constitutional.105 Analyzing Congress’s intent in
passing the statute, the Court highlighted INS’s failure to “deal
with increasing rates of criminal activity by aliens” and that
INS “could not even identify most deportable aliens, much less
locate them and remove them from the country.”106 The Court
also noted that some studies presented to Congress suggested
that detention was the best way to ensure criminal immigrants
are successfully removed from the United States.107 It was
against this backdrop that Congress passed 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)
and the Court evaluated it.108
Defendant Mr. Kim relied on the Court’s decision in
Zadvydas when presenting his constitutional challenge,
requiring the Court to distinguish these seemingly similar
cases.109 First, the Court highlighted that the immigrants in
Zadvydas challenged their detention because removal was not
attainable,110 whereas in Kim’s challenge, the statute pertained
to criminal immigrants who were detained pending their
removal proceedings.111 The Court asserted that detention was
necessary to prevent deportable immigrants from fleeing
during their removal proceedings.112 Even though Congress did
not fully consider individualized bond hearings when it enacted 8
U.S.C. § 1226(c), the Court stated, “when the Government deals
with deportable aliens, the Due Process Clause does not require it
to employ the least burdensome means to accomplish its goal.”113
The second distinction the Court made between
Zadvydas and Demore was that “[w]hile the period of detention
at issue in Zadvydas was ‘indefinite’ and ‘potentially
permanent,’ . . . the detention [in Demore] is of a much shorter
duration.”114 In Zadvydas, detention after the post-removal
period expired was indefinite because Germany would not
accept Mr. Zadvydas, whereas for Mr. Kim, “detention [has] a
definite termination point, in the majority of cases it lasts for
less than the 90 days [the majority] considered presumptively
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003).
Id. at 518 (emphasis omitted).
107 Id. at 521.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 526–29.
110 Mr. Zadvydas argued that removal was not obtainable because neither Germany
nor Lithuania would accept him, and he argued that there was no reasonable possibility of
removal in the foreseeable future. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 684, 702 (2001).
111 Demore, 538 U.S. at 527–28.
112 Id. at 528.
113 Id.; see also Taylor, supra note 36, at 349, 354.
114 Demore, 538 U.S. at 528 (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690–91).
105

106
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valid in Zadvydas.”115 The Court pointed to statistics showing
that 85 percent of deportation proceedings were completed in
an average of forty-seven days and a median of thirty days.116
Therefore, the Court ruled that detention “for the limited
period of [Mr. Kim’s] removal proceedings” is constitutional.117
One cannot ignore the different tones the Supreme
Court took in Zadvydas and Demore.118 In Zadvydas, the Court
took an immigrant-friendly approach and reaffirmed the
principle that immigrants are protected by the Due Process
Clause,119 whereas the Court in Demore reaffirmed a principle
from Mathews v. Diaz120 that “Congress may make rules as to
aliens that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”121 In
the several years following these two decisions, the circuit
courts struggled to agree on what the Supreme Court failed to
address in Zadvydas and Demore: do prolonged detentions
require due process?122 And if they do, at what point in the
detention does due process require a bond hearing?123
B.

Circuits Split on “Trigger Point”124 At Which Due Process
Requires a Bond Hearing

In the years after Zadvydas and Demore, one thing the
circuit courts could agree on was that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) “does
not permit the government to detain a criminal alien for an
unreasonable amount of time without providing a bond
hearing” for constitutional reasons.125 The circuit courts were
split as to the point at which detention of a criminal immigrant
becomes unreasonable and thus unconstitutional.126 The circuit
courts adopted two different approaches: the first was the case-bycase approach, making the point at which detention becomes
unreasonable dependent on the specific facts of the case, and the
second was the bright-line approach, which drew the unreasonable
detention line at the six-month mark.127 The Supreme Court,
however, took neither approach in its Jennings decision, holding
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127

Id. at 529.
Id.
Id. at 531.
Sherry, supra note 88, at 251; Taylor, supra note 36, at 349, 353.
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689, 693–94.
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80 (1976).
Demore, 538 U.S. at 522.
Chemerinsky, supra note 91.
Johnson, supra note 34.
Sopo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 825 F.3d 1199, 1214 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1223.
Id.
Id.

1512

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:4

that criminal immigrants are not entitled to bond hearings at any
point while in detention awaiting removal.128
III.

THE JENNINGS DECISION FALLS SHORT

The Supreme Court’s decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez
is yet another setback for criminal immigrants. Due process
demands more for criminal immigrants and to achieve due
process for criminal immigrants facing detention, Congress
must amend 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
A.

The Jennings Outcome

The Supreme Court, in a five to three vote,129 reversed
and remanded the Ninth Circuit’s six-month limit on detention
and decided that no temporal limitation should be read into 8
U.S.C. § 1226(c).130 The Court stated that “[Section] 1226(c)
does not on its face limit the length of detention it authorizes”
and that the language of the statute “reinforces the conclusion
that aliens detained under [the Attorney General’s] authority
are not entitled to be released under any circumstances other
than those expressly recognized by the statute.”131 In sum,
criminal immigrants must be detained for the entire duration
of their removal proceedings and are not entitled to a bond
hearing.132 The Court remanded the case back to the Ninth
Circuit to determine whether indefinite detention without a
bail hearing is unconstitutional.133
The Supreme Court’s ruling makes clear that the
Justices did not want to rewrite a statute in order to comport
with due process. The Court ignored, however, the practical
advantages of ruling otherwise. As the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit reasoned in Reid v. Donelan, “the
practical advantages of . . . [a] bright-line rule . . . are persuasive
justifications for legislative or administrative intervention, not
judicial decree.”134 Given the Court’s decision, it is imperative
that Congress address the issue and amend the statute.
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 833 (2018).
Justice Kagan recused herself because, while solicitor general, she
authorized a filing during an earlier phase of the case. Allissa Wickham, Justice Kagan
Steps Back from Immigrant Detention Case, LAW360 (Nov. 13, 2017, 10:03 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/984302 [https://perma.cc/DX95-ZQWC].
130 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 835. There are two other statutes at issue in
Jennings, neither are the focus of this note. Id. at 834.
131 Id. at 846.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 835.
134 Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486, 498 (1st Cir. 2016).
128

129
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A Dire Situation: The Immigration Court Backlog Is the
Highest It Has Ever Been

The Supreme Court in Jennings failed to address how
current detention conditions and overall immigration climate
are starkly different from those of 1996, when Congress passed
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). As a result, the Supreme Court’s decision
will have significant consequences for immigrants in limbo and
could lead to even more due process violations if Congress does
not properly address the issue.
The backlog of immigration court is the worst it has ever
135
been. On June 1, 2017, the Government Accountability Office
issued a report by the Executive Office for Immigration Review
on the management of the immigration court system.136 Covering
the years 2006 to 2015, the report found that cases pending
more than doubled between those years.137 Currently, a criminal
immigrant must wait almost two years for a hearing and
remains detained during this time under the current statute.138
Current statistics paint a much different picture than
the ones the Supreme Court provided in Demore,139 which were
later revealed to be inaccurate. The statistics in Demore, based
on the government’s brief from the Executive Office for
Immigration Review, stated that “85% of the cases in which
aliens are detained pursuant to § 1226(c), removal proceedings
are completed in an average time of 47 days and a median of 30
days.”140 For the remaining 15 percent of cases, where the
immigrant appeals the decision to the Board of Immigration
Appeals, “take[ ] an average of four months, with a median
time that is slightly shorter.”141 This is important since the
135 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-438, IMMIGRATION
COURTS: ACTIONS NEEDED TO REDUCE CASE BACKLOG AND ADDRESS LONG-STANDING
MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES 21 (2017) [hereinafter GAO-17-438]; Akilah
Johnson, At Immigration Courts, A Growing Backlog, BOSTON GLOBE (June 23, 2017),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/06/22/immigration-courts-growing-backlog/eP1PU
mY7Yez55JCVMKERAJ/story.html [https://perma.cc/XF6A-L2Q2]; Julia Preston, Deluged
Immigration Courts, Where Cases Stall for Years, Begin to Buckle, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/01/us/deluged-immigration-courts-where-cases-stall-foryears-begin-to-buckle.html [https://perma.cc/TR9C-4LBM]; Maria Sacchetti, DOJ Details
Plan to Slash Immigration Court Backlog, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/local/immigration/doj-details-plan-to-slash-immigration-court-bac
klog/2017/11/03/03fcef34-c0a0-11e7-959c-fe2b598d8c00_story.html?utm_term=.b0e78e6fb53
3 [https://perma.cc/3DV3-XYCA].
136 GAO-17-438, supra note 135.
137 Id.;
Immigration Court Backlog Tool, TRAC IMMIGRATION ,
http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/[https://perma.cc/M5NS-N545].
138 Id.
139 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 529 (2003).
140 Id.
141 Id.
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Supreme Court’s decision in Demore was premised on the fact
that there was a definite, shorter detention period than in
Zadvydas.142 In fact, the Acting Solicitor General during the
time of Demore admitted that the statistics the government
provided to the Court were “seriously inaccurate.”143 The latest
statistics show an average detention period of more than a
year, which is three times the estimate on which the Supreme
Court based its Demore decision.144
Given the backlog of immigration court today, detention
periods are, in fact, indefinite. What was once an outlier case—
an immigrant detained for the longer-than-average six
months—is now the case immigrants hope for, as many today
face years before their cases are adjudicated.145 With longer
detention periods comes the dire need for a due process
mechanism to protect immigrants’ liberty. Additionally, with
the current administration’s push to detain and deport more
immigrants, more people could end up in the system, creating
longer waiting periods, and more due process violations for
these detainees.146
C.

The Effects of Detention on Immigrants and Society

Not only is prolonged detention without a bond hearing
a violation of due process, but it is also ripping families apart
and ruining lives, further justifying why immigrants need
congressional action.147 Most of the criminal immigrants who
find themselves in this situation have strong community ties,
are hard workers, go to school, and have lived in the United
States since they were young.148 By being subjected to
prolonged detention, they lose their jobs, custody of their
children, contact with their families, and their livelihoods.149

Id. at 513, 529–30.
Letter from Ian Heath Gershengorn, Acting Solicitor Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to Hon. Scott S. Harris, Clerk, Supreme Court of the U.S. (Aug. 26, 2016),
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/Demore.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3NF88RE] [hereinafter Gershengorn Letter]; Chemerinsky, supra note 91.
144 Chemerinsky, supra note 91; Gershengorn Letter, supra note 143.
145 Preston, supra note 135.
146 Editorial
Board, Trump’s Aggressive Immigration Enforcement is
Overwhelming an Already Taxed Court System, L.A. TIMES (June 30, 2017, 4:00 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-trump-immigration-courts-deportations-2
0170630-story.html [https://perma.cc/GQ8B-W7N8].
147 Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1072–73 (9th Cir. 2015), rev’d sub
nom. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
148 Id.
149 Id.; see generally Kalina M. Brabeck, M. Brinton Lykes & Cristina Hunter,
The Psychological Impact of Detention and Deportation on U.S. Migrant Children and
142
143
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That the class of people at issue is criminals does not
justify prolonged detention periods without a bond hearing. .
Often the crimes for which an immigrant is found removable are
minor offenses or non-violent crimes, such as shoplifting and
minor drug offenses.150 Moreover, detention during removal
proceedings for a criminal immigrant happens after they have
served time for their crime, and sometimes the deportation
period is longer than the sentence for the underlying crime.151 In
the interest of justice and human rights, Congress should amend
the statute so that criminal immigrants are subjected only to
reasonable detention times, as required by the Constitution.
IV.

CONGRESS: TIME TO AMEND 8 U.S.C. § 1226(C)

It is imperative that Congress take action to ensure that
criminal immigrants in detention receive the due process to
which the Constitution affords them as they await the outcome
of their deportation proceedings. Because a Supreme Court
ruling will not be enough to ensure this,152 nor is it judicially
proper for the Court to re-write the statute, Congress should
amend 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). The amendment should change the
statute to include a bright-line six-month rule that is easily
administrable by the courts and uniform across all cases
involving detention of criminal immigrants.153
Specifically, Congress should add a Section (2) to 8
U.S.C. § 1226(c) that reads:
(2) Prolonged Detention
If detention under § 1226(c)(1) lasts six months, then the alien must
be afforded bond hearings, with the possibility of release into the
United States, unless the government demonstrates by clear and
convincing evidence that the alien is a flight risk or a danger to the
community.

Families, 84 AM. J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 496 (2014), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/
df59/818dc1a9103681ddab2cf2894353ef8cc76c.pdf [https://perma.cc/JU2A-6JYS].
150 Rodriguez, 804 F.3d at 1072–73; Taylor, supra note 36, at 343; Tina Vasquez,
Supreme Court Hears Case on Stripping Migrants of Due Process Rights, REWIRE (Nov.
30, 2016, 5:06 PM), https://rewire.news/article/2016/11/30/supreme-court-hears-casestripping-migrants-due-process-rights/ [https://perma.cc/URU8-FVQK] (discussing the
story of Astrid Morataya who came to the United States when she was eight years old,
was convicted for a low-level drug crime when she was older during a rough period in her
life, subjected to two years in mandatory detention, and forced to obtain a U-Visa and
testify against her attacker in order to stay in the United States to be with her children).
151 Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 271 (6th Cir. 2004).
152 See supra, Part III.
153 Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 616 (2d Cir. 2015).
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This language will ensure consistency and provide clarity.
Moreover, it will insulate the detainee from discrimination that
can result from variables such as whether the immigrant is
represented by counsel or what judge is presiding over the
hearing. Most importantly, it will guarantee due process in a
time when backlogs and mass deportation are clogging up the
system. As Justice Kennedy said in his Demore concurrence,
“since the Due Process Clause prohibits arbitrary deprivations
of liberty . . . [an] alien . . . could be entitled to an
individualized determination as to his risk of flight and
dangerousness if the continued detention became unreasonable
or unjustified.”154 There is strong evidence to suggest that the
Supreme Court and Congress consider that anything longer
than six months is unreasonable.155 Thus, Congress should
codify a six-month limitation into the statute.
In reality, this amendment would inevitably receive
backlash, especially given the current administration’s staunch
stance on immigration issues.156 One major critique could be
that the Department of Homeland Security’s mission is to
protect the United States from terrorism and other security
threats, and by allowing hearings at the six-month mark, this
amendment would do the opposite, since it may allow criminal
immigrants to be released and commit more crimes.157 This
amendment, however, does not automatically release criminal
immigrants after six months. It entitles a criminal immigrant
to a bond hearing at six months, where the government can
show that he or she is a danger to the community or a flight
risk if there is concern that the immigrant may commit more
crimes. As stated in an oral argument in Jennings, the court
“gives triple ax murderers . . . bail hearings.”158 Criminal
immigrants convicted of mostly non-violent offenses should be
afforded the same constitutionally-required bail hearings.
Individual bond hearings are the norm. In fact, “[i]n all
contexts apart from immigration and military detention, the
Court has found that the Constitution requires some
individualized process and a judicial or administrative finding
154 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 532 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(citations omitted).
155 Lora, 804 F.3d at 615.
156 Matt Ford, President Trump’s Immigration Policy Takes Shape, ATLANTIC
(Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/trump-immigrationdeportation-memo/517395/ [https://perma.cc/5CTH-26VC].
157 Our Mission, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/ourmission [https://perma.cc/R6CT-HP54].
158 Transcript of Oral Argument at 11, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830,
833 (2018) (No. 15–1204).
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that a legitimate governmental interest justifies detention of
the person in question.”159 This note’s proposed amendment
would not release droves of criminals into American streets;
rather, it would afford immigrants a procedural safeguard to
ensure that the government has a legitimate interest in
depriving the immigrant’s liberty.160
Despite critics’ concerns, there are good reasons why the
statute should be rewritten to include a six-month limit. There
is a strong history of both the Supreme Court and Congress
determining detention periods of longer than six months
without a hearing as unreasonable. The Supreme Court in
Zadvydas found that detention periods over six months raised
constitutionality concerns.161 The Court emphasized that the
six-month mark does not mean every criminal immigrant
should be released at six months, it just means that the
immigrant should be afforded a bond hearing after this time.162
The same procedure should be applied with the amended 8
U.S.C. § 1226(c). Additionally, before 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) was
amended in 1996, a criminal immigrant could not be detained
for more than six months and when the six-month period
expired, the statute required the immigrant’s release under the
Attorney General’s supervision.163 Because the Supreme Court
has found that detention over six months is presumptively
unreasonable, and thus raises issues of constitutionality, the
six-month mark is the best duration for an amended statute.
CONCLUSION
As the Supreme Court has said, “[f]reedom from
imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other
forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that
[the Due Process] Clause protects.”164 While the Court has
159 Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1075 (9th Cir. 2015), rev’d sub nom.
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
160 Id. at 1090.
161 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001); Farrin R. Anello, Due Process and
Temporal Limits on Mandatory Immigration Detention, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 363, 391 (2014).
162 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
163 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (1994) (“When a final order of deportation . . . is made
against any alien, the Attorney General shall have a period of six months from the date
of such order, or, if judicial review is had, then from the date of the final order of the
court, within which to effect the alien’s departure from the United States.”). Bassett,
supra note 76, at 460. Note that for immigrants who committed an aggravated felony,
the statute required the Attorney General to take him or her into custody, but
permitted release upon a determination that the criminal immigrant did not pose a
flight risk or danger to the community. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (1994); Bassett, supra
note 76, at 460.
164 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
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found that government detention violates the Due Process
Clause in criminal proceedings unless procedural mechanisms
are in place, it has neglected to do so for criminal immigrants
in detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
After years of litigation surrounding Congress’s
mandatory detention scheme, only one thing seems to be clear:
the jurisprudence has come out on the wrong side of justice. Since
the Supreme Court has tackled the issue of mandatory detention
statutes in Zadvydas and Demore, the circuit courts have been
divided on this issue of whether a limitation should be read into 8
U.S.C. § 1226(c) in order to ensure immigrants’ due process rights
are not violated. Even though the Supreme Court took up this
issue in Jennings, the decision leaves detained criminal
immigrants without recourse. Because of the dire situation
imposed by the immigration court backlog and the unreasonably
negative effects that the Jennings decision imposes on the
immigrant, it is paramount that Congress rewrite the statute.
Immigrants’ due process rights demand action.
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